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ADDITIONAL DETERMINATIVE CASES 
Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp (1982) 656 P.2d 429, 430 
Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties (1992) 
838 P. 2d 672, 673 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 28, 1998, Defendant was personally served with a Supplemental 
Proceedings Order in this action at Defendant's home address (hereinafter "Defendant's 
Home Address") at 1116 West 285 South in Orem, Utah. [R. 110] There is no evidence 
or other reference in the record in this appeal showing that Defendant was ever served at 
Defendant's Home Address of any notice of the judgment, amended judgment, or motion 
for summary judgment upon which such judgments were based herein. Within two (2) 
weeks after receiving such actual notice of the judgment, Defendant appeared at court on 
the Supplemental Proceedings and within one week later hired current counsel. Current 
counsel promptly contacted Plaintiff's counsel and made Plaintiff's counsel aware from the 
outset that Defendant's current counsel would be moving the trial court to set aside the 
judgments. In light of such circumstances, Defendant appeals to this court for relief in 
order that Defendant may simply afforded substantial due process consisting of a fair 
opportunity to defend this action on the merits. 
/ / / 
I I I 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The most important fact rendering Defendant entitled to the relief requested in this 
appeal is that Defendant did not have "ACTUAL" notice of the judgment entered against 
him until August 28, 1998 when a Supplemental Proceedings Order was personally served 
on Defendant at Defendant's Home Address. By such time, the three (3) months1 period 
of time permitting relief under Rule 60 (b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, had since 
expired. Nonetheless, Defendant actively made diligent efforts to find out facts about how 
such a judgment could have been entered against him, hired current counsel, and instructed 
Defendant's current counsel to move the trial court to set aside the judgment. Defendant 
was substantially deprived of due process in this matter and is therefore entitled to relief 
under Rule 60 (b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Also, Plaintiff's counsel did not comply with the Spirit of Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in providing the best means available to afford actual notice of the 
judgment to Defendant, since Plaintiff's counsel knew at all times that Defendant could be 
served with such actual notice at Defendant's Home Address. As such, Defendant was 
deprived of due process and the balance of fairness for this reason and for others set forth 
in the Arguments Section hereinbelow should tip in favor of granting relief to Defendant. 
In addition, Defendant is entitled to relief herein on the grounds of deprivation of 
due process, regardless of whether or not this court agrees with Defendant's separate and 
independent grounds for relief of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's primary 
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entitlement to such relief is based on lack of due process and on that ground alone should 
be granted the relief requested herein. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE KEY TO DEFENDANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF UNDER 
RULE 60 (b)(6) IS THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT NEVER HAD 
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN THE 
THREE MONTHS' PERIOD AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. 
Two (2) specific cases illustrate that the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of 
Appeals favor ruling for Defendant in the instant case based on the fact that Defendant 
never received "ACTUAL" notice of the default judgment entered within the three (3) 
months period following entry thereof. For example, in 1982, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp (1982) 656 P.2d 429, 430, and then the Utah 
Court of Appeals in 1992, in Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern 
Properties (1992) 838 P.2d 672, 673, both courts found that the defendants in such cases 
had obtained "actual" notice of the respective default judgments when such defendants 
were personally served with a Supplemental Proceedings Order within the three (3) 
months' period following entry of such judgments. Both courts thus ruled against the 
defendants in such cases for having not taken action to set aside the judgment within such 
three months' period. 
/ / / 
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Also, in Lincoln, the defendant had argued that plaintiff s counsel had failed to give 
proper notice under Rule 58A(d) and Rule 4-504(4). However, the court ruled that failure 
to give such notice under such rules did not invalidate the judgment. Rather, the court 
focused on whether actual notice had been received by defendant within the three 
months' window after entry of the judgment and how quickly defendant acted upon 
receiving such notice. 
In the case at bar, Defendant received "actual" notice of the judgment in the same 
manner as did the defendants in Gardiner, supra at 430, and Lincoln, supra at 675, 
namely, by personal service of a Supplemental Proceedings Order. However, in stark 
contrast to the defendants in those cases. Defendant in the case at bar did not receive 
such actual notice until after expiration of the three months' period following entry 
of the judgment. Even counsel for Plaintiff in the case at bar confirms that "The 
Supplemental Order is also a Notice of the Entry of Judgment." [See Appellee's Brief, 
Page 19, Lines 3-4] 
Although there is no reported Utah case where the defendant did not receive actual 
notice of the default judgment until after the three months period had expired, it is obvious 
from Gardiner and Lincoln that the proper ruling to be made here is that as long as 
Defendant acted diligently once he received actual notice, even if such actual notice 
occured after the three months period had expired, then Defendant is entitled to relief 
under Rule 60 (b)(6). The reason being is that lack of due process is a reason long 
4 
established for justifying relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) as confirmed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P.2d 21, 22, 11 Utah 2d 357. 
The arguments by Plaintiff's counsel that Defendant received "notice" of the motion for 
summary judgment and of the judgment are only arguments. In fact, Plaintiff's counsel 
even notes that he obtained issuance of a Supplemental Proceedings Order less than one 
month after judgment had been entered. However, Plaintiff's counsel fails to inform the 
Court about "the rest of the story" which is that the record reflects that such first 
Supplemental Proceedings Order was not served on Defendant until August 13, 1998, by 
substituted service [R. 107], after the three months' window of Rule 60 (b)(1), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, had expired. The record demonstrates that none of the notices mailed 
by Plaintiff's counsel were ever sent to Defendant at Defendant's Home Address where 
Plaintiff's counsel demonstrated more than once he knew to be a sure place to serve actual 
notice on Defendant. As such, Defendant is entitled to relief herein. 
II. THE EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
DILIGENT. 
It is necessary in this Section of Defendant's Reply to dispel the many conclusory 
statements made by Plaintiffs counsel against Defendant in Appellee's Brief which 
concern the issue of Defendant' s diligence. Plaintiff s counsel not only attempts to mislead 
this Court regarding such issue but actually has lied to this Court about certain "facts" in 
efforts to cloud the truth as shown below. Such conduct by Plaintiffs counsel further 
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demonstrates the need for this Court to exercise its authority and grant relief to Defendant 
so that he can have a fair opportunity to defend himself on the merits of this case. This 
Section is broken down into three (3) main time periods: (a) After Defendant's prior 
counsel withdrew and before entry of judgment; (b) during the three months' period after 
judgment was entered; and (c) once Defendant obtained actual notice of the judgment. 
A. DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT DURING THE PERIOD 
AFTER HIS PRIOR COUNSEL WITHDREW AND 
BEFORE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. 
Plaintiff's counsel has blatantly lied in efforts to mislead this Court into 
believing that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions for a 
period of seventeen (17) months. In fact, Plaintiff's counsel stated as follows: 
The discovery was served on Armenta in July, 1997, prior to 
withdrawal of his first attorney. Despite knowing of the 
discovery since July, 1997, Armenta and his new counsel took 
no action to answer the discovery for a seventeen (17) month 
period despite an order of the trial court compelling Armenta 
to answer. [See Appellee's Brief, Page 14, Lines 3-6] 
On the contrary, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff's first, not second, set of Request 
for Admissions was served on Defendant on July 22, 1997. [R. 137-142 (Exhibit "2")] 
The record also proves that Defendant responded to such first set of Request for 
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Admissions as confirmed by the Court's prior discovery motion order dated November 3, 
1997. [R. 157-158 (Exhibit" "6")] The court's order granted an award of fees but made 
no order requiring discovery responses from Defendant because the court found that 
Defendant had already produced such responses. [R. 157-158 (Exhibit ""6")] Also, it is 
clear that Plaintiff's second, not first, set of Request for Admissions was served on 
December 2, 1997 [R. 159-164 (Exhibit "7")], which was one (1) month after the trial 
court confirmed that Defendant had responded to the first Request for Admissions. In 
addition, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment which ultimately was granted was not 
filed until January 29, 1998. [R. 85-86] In fact, once Defendant obtained actual notice 
of such Motion, Defendant not only filed the subject Motion to Vacate the judgment herein 
but also Defendant served full and complete written responses to Plaintiff's second set of 
discovery requests. [R. 180-220 (Exhibit "15"), R. 257-258] Therefore, the contentions 
by Plaintiff1 s counsel are totally deceptive in light of the clear record before this 
Court. As such, Defendant cannot be found to have been lacking in diligence in 
responding to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Defendant is thus entitled to prevail in this 
appeal. 
In addition, Plaintiff's counsel focuses on the trial court's improper finding 
that "the Defendant is responsible for failing to remain in contact with his attorney who 
was representing him through the Motion for Summary Judgment in this case". Such 
finding flies in the face of facts and evidence before the trial court and this Court which 
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indicate otherwise. How could Defendant be responsible for not remaining in contact with 
his attorney when his attorney, Mr. Russell, withdrew as counsel BEFORE the Motion 
for Summary Judgment was even filed? Defendant had no attorney with which to 
communicate during such period of time and prior to such time any communication with 
counsel would not have helped Defendant to gain knowledge of the not-yet-filed-or-served 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The record demonstrates clearly that Mr. Russell 
withdrew as counsel on January 15, 1998 [R. 166-167] and that Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed on January 29, 1998. [R. 85-86] Thus, Mr. Russell was 
not representing Defendant through the time when the Motion for Summary Judgment was 
filed rendering the trial court's finding unsupported and irrelevant. The real issue was 
whether or not Defendant had actual notice of such Motion. Since Defendant did not have 
actual notice of such Motion, Defendant has been deprived of due process and has not had 
a fair opportunity to defend himself on the merits. 
Also, the assertion by Plaintiff's counsel that". . .his [Defendant's] attorneys 
withdrew because Defendant failed to cooperate with his counsel in answering discovery" 
is unfounded in terms of Plaintiff's counsel's attempt to prove some type of pattern of 
Defendant's conduct in not communicating properly with his attorneys. While Ms. Chacon 
did indicate in her Motion to Withdraw that she was unable to reach Defendant during a 
four (4) week period eariler in the case, there is no evidence in the record or otherwise 
which indicates any reason why Mr. Russell withdrew as counsel for Defendant. Again, 
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Plaintiff's counsel is free with asserting conclusory statements without being so kind as to 
provide the Court or Defendant's counsel with any clue as to where evidentiary support 
for such statements exists. The answer is that there is no evidentiary support for such 
assertions by Plaintiff's counsel. As such, this Court must disregard such unsupported 
contentions and not be misled by the continuous efforts by Plaintiff's counsel to shift the 
focus of this Court away from the real issues and real evidence to be reviewed in this 
appeal. 
Plaintiff's counsel also claims, again without support and in total 
contradiction to the actual evidence before the court, that Defendant ". . .condoned the 
filing of affidavits by his son bearing forged signatures purporting to be his." [see 
Appellee's Brief, Page 13, Lines 14-15] Such mudslinging by Plaintiff's counsel is 
needless and in fact done in bad faith. The only evidence before the court on this issue 
was as set forth in the Declarations of Defendant and one of his sons, Sergio Armenta. 
In both Declarations, great detail is provided which explain that Defendant's prior 
attorney, Mr. Russell, acted so grossly incompetent that he attempted to have Sergio 
Armenta sign an affidavit on behalf of Defendant in opposition to a prior Motion to 
Compel by Plaintiff. [R. 234-245 % 6] Sergio explained that he had been misled by Mr. 
Russell into signing such affidavit and that he never would have signed it otherwise 
because he knew he was not authorized to sign any such statement on behalf of his father, 
Defendant in this action. [R. 234-245 1 6] Also, Defendant's Declaration confirms that 
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he had not authorized Sergio to sign any such affidavit for Defendant. [R. 234-245 % 6 
and R. 226-233 t1 9, 10] If any misconduct occurred regarding such affidavit, it was 
solely by attorney Mr. Russell, not Defendant or Defendant's son, Sergio. Thus, the 
statement by Plaintiff's counsel that Defendant has condoned improper conduct is totally 
false and is irrelevant since it deals with an affidavit in a prior discovery motion which has 
nothing to do with the real issue at hand of Defendant's diligence. As such, Plaintiff's 
counsel is showing his true colors in how he is making further efforts to prevent Defendant 
from receiving the benefits of due process and to deny Defendant of his constitutional and 
statutory rights to have a trial on the merits of this case. 
In addition, Plaintiffs counsel attempts to analogize the facts of the case of 
Gardiner, supra, with those of the case at bar in terms of the court in Gardiner finding that 
the defendant lacked diligence. However, Plaintiffs counsel has totally misrepresented 
the facts of such case because the court in Gardiner ruled against defendant for having 
failed to communicate with the defendant's attorney for an alarming period of one and one-
half (1 1/2) years. 
In contrast, Defendant in this case was actively pursuing the defense of this 
case including hiring a second attorney later in the case, Mr. Russell, to defend against 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in September 1997. Communication with Mr. Russell was 
not the problem. Rather, the problem came shortly thereafter, when Mr. Russell withdrew 
as counsel, leaving Defendant without counsel. Defendant did not receive actual notice 
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of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed a mere nine (9) days alter Mr. Russell's 
withdrawal nor the judgment obtained by Plaintiff based thereon. [R. 226-233 1 13] As 
such, the defendant in Gardiner having not communicated with its attorney for one and 
one-half years has no relation to the proper conduct of Defendant in this action. The real 
reason why Defendant was unable to act sooner to file his Motion to Vacate the instant 
judgment was because Defendant did not have actual notice of such judgment until August 
28, 1998, as described above. As such, Defendant acted diligently in defending his 
interests. 
B. DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT DURING THE THREE 
MONTHS' PERIOD AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. 
The judgment in this case was entered first on April 23, 1998 [R. 96-97] and 
then as amended on May 7, 1998 [R. 102-104] The record demonstrates that Defendant 
did not receive actual notice of either judgment until served personally with the 
Supplemental Proceedings Order on August 28, 1998 [R. 174-176 (Exhibit "13"); R. 226-
233 f 16] which Plaintiff's counsel concedes is tantamount to giving notice of entry of 
judgment. [See Appellee's Brief, Page 19, Lines 3-4] Not having received any actual 
notice of such judgment during the three months' period after entry of judgment rendered 
Defendant unalerted to the need to take actions to protect his interests. Without any such 
actual notice, a lay person could not be deemed lacking in diligence for failing to contact 
the court about any possible events occuring in the lawsuit during a mere three month 
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Proceedings. [R. 226-233 t l 16-17] After learning from Mr. Flores that a judgment had 
been entered against Defendant, and on September 21, 1998 (only three weeks after 
obtaining actual notice of the judgment), Defendant hired current counsel, Montivel A. 
Burke, II, to represent him in this action. [R. 226-233 t l 17-18] Such conduct constituted 
prompt action by Defendant. 
Also, Plaintiff s counsel points out the time of filing of appearance of counsel 
by Defendant's attorney, Montivel A. Burke, II, in November 1998 in an attempt to show 
the court that Defendant waited too long to hire an attorney to file the instant Motion to 
Vacate the judgment in this case. However, as set forth in the Declarations of Defendant 
[R. 226-233 f 18] and Defendant's current counsel [R. 253-256 3], Defendant hired 
current counsel a mere three (3) weeks after obtaining actual notice of the judgment and 
this was after Defendant had already appeared one time for the Supplemental Proceedings 
hearing in this action. November 1998 merely represents the time when Defendant's 
current counsel performed the minor function of filing the paper entitled "Notice of 
Appearance of Counsel". 
In addition, there were many facts and events in this case to review and the 
law surrounding vacating the judgment entered against Defendant were complex. 
Defendant's current counsel felt that diligence was required on his part to ensure that 
Defendant had a proper right to vacate the judgment before filing same. [R. 253-256 ff 
4-5] Indeed, by the time Defendant had received actual notice of the judgment, the three 
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period of time when before in the case Defendant had expected he would receive notices 
from Plaintiff's counsel about such events, such as when he was served personally with 
process in the case and when Plaintiff's attorney served the previous Motion to Compel, 
both of which received responses by Defendant. 
In addition, only Plaintiff, not Defendant, was responsible for pushing this 
case along, since Defendant had not filed a counterclaim in this matter such as to pose 
similar duties upon Defendant for moving the case along. Thus, Defendant acted diligently 
during this period of time. 
C. DEFENDANT WAS DILIGENT ONCE HE RECEIVED 
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff s counsel makes the wild contention that Defendant was not diligent 
because he failed to contact his attorney for a period of ten (10) months after his prior 
attorney, Mr. Steven Russell, withdrew as counsel. However, such contention is far from 
the truth. As set forth in detail hereinabove, Defendant acted diligently during the period 
of time prior to receiving actual notice of the judgment. In addition, once Defendant 
learned of the judgment on August 28, 1998, Defendant took prompt action to protect his 
interests. 
The record reflects that Defendant appeared less than two (2) weeks later at 
the Court for the Supplemental Proceedings hearing on September 10, 1998, and shortly 
thereafter contacted attorney German Flores to find out the import of such Supplemental 
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months' window following entry of the judgment had already expired, so filing of 
Defendant's Motion to Vacate even the same day current counsel for Defendant was hired 
would not have changed that fact. 
Meanwhile, however, Defendant's current counsel promptly contacted 
Plaintiff's counsel to get copies of relevant documents in the case and even appeared at the 
office of Plaintiff's counsel with Defendant to have Defendant answer questions in lieu of 
Plaintiff's counsel scheduling another Supplemental Proceedings hearing. [R. 253-256 1f 
5] Plaintiff's counsel is estopped to argue that Defendant failed to hire an attorney to 
defend his interests until the time when Defendant's current counsel actually filed the paper 
called "Notice of Appearance of Counsel" with the court in November 1998 when 
Plaintiff's counsel knew two (2) months previous thereto that Defendant's current counsel 
had been hired and intended to move to vacate the instant judgment. Defendant's current 
counsel spelled out in great detail the efforts and time exerted to investigate this case, both 
facts and law, to ensure that Defendant's rights were properly protected. As such, both 
Defendant and his current counsel were diligent in pursuing the vacating of the judgment 
entered against Defendant herein. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAW. 
Plaintiff's counsel argues that "last known address" as the term is used in Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure means the address stated on the withdrawal notice by 
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Defendant's prior attorney, Mr. Russell. However, Plaintiffs counsel offers no case law 
or other authority to support this proposition. Indeed, such an interpretation may apply 
in many cases but cannot be said to apply strictly in all cases. 
In the case at bar, the facts presented, as demonstrated by proper evidence 
submitted previously by Defendant, illustrate that Defendant's Home Address and business 
address were clearly known to Plaintiffs counsel. In particular, the specific evidence 
presented by Defendant on this fact is that Plaintiff's counsel caused service of process on 
Defendant personally at the inception of this lawsuit at Defendant's Home Address. [R. 
32-35] Then, when Plaintiff's counsel made efforts to collect on the default judgment 
against Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel caused service of the Supplemental Proceedings 
Order on Defendant personally at Defendant's Home Address. [R. 108-110] Plaintiff's 
counsel has presented no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that Plaintiff's counsel 
made any efforts to locate Defendant at the address listed on the withdrawal notice 
by Defendant's prior counsel, Mr. Russell. Rather, both Supplemental Proceedings 
Orders served on Defendant in this action were served at Defendant's Home Address in 
August 1998 [R. 107, 110] which was the first time that Defendant was given actual notice 
of the judgment herein. It is undisputed that Plaintiff's counsel had clear knowledge that 
Defendant still resided at Defendant's Home Address and that the best means of providing 
actual notice to Defendant of such a critical and huge money judgment was to serve 
Defendant at Defendant's Home Address. As such, Defendant is entitled to relief herein. 
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It is reasonable to assume that the Utah Legislature intended under any set of facts 
for a defendant to be afforded due process by having the plaintiff use the best means 
available of affording actual notice to the defendant. In the case at bar, the best means 
available to Plaintiff's counsel of affording actual notice to Defendant of the judgment was 
by serving Defendant at Defendant's Home Address as shown by Plaintiff's counsel 
locating Defendant personally both at the beginning of this lawsuit and at the time of 
collection on the judgment. Therefore, whether Plaintiff's counsel followed the Letter of 
the law under Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in serving notices of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and judgment itself is not the critical issue. Rather, since Plaintiff's 
counsel failed to follow the Spirit of the law under the factual circumstances of this case, 
Defendant was deprived of due process by not receiving actual notice of the judgment until 
August 28, 1998. In fact. Plaintiff's counsel has failed to submit any evidence 
whatsoever to demonstrate that Defendant obtained actual notice of the judgment 
prior to August 28, 1998. And, by such time, the three (3) months' window of Rule 60 
(b)(1) was closed, which is why Rule 60 (b)(6) is the appropriate Rule enacted for this very 
purpose of affording due process to defendants. Based thereon, the dictates of due process 
and equity demand that Defendant be granted a fair opportunity to have a trial on the 
merits. Under the facts and circumstances of the case at bar, lack of actual notice to 
Defendant of the judgment was tantamount to lack of due process. Thus, this Court 
should grant all relief requested by Defendant on this appeal. 
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IV. EQUITY REQUIRES GRANTING DEFENDANT RELIEF ON THIS APPEAL. 
There are many facts as supported by competent evidence submitted by Defendant 
which demonstrate that the demands of equity provide relief to Defendant on this appeal. 
For example, the very judgment obtained by Plaintiff herein was based on a second set of 
Request for Admissions (never received by Defendant until after acquiring actual notice 
of the judgment in August 1998). Yet, the questions contained in such second set of 
Request for Admissions were almost identical to those questions which were stated in 
Plaintiff's first set of Request for Admissions to which Defendant had responded. 
The first set of Request for Admissions stated only three (3) questions as follows 
[R. 132-142 (Exhibit "2")]: 
1. Admit that you are a guarantor under the terms and conditions of the 
lease, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", [emphasis added] 
2. Admit that you signed the Guarantee, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". [emphasis added] 
3. Admit that there is a balance due and owing under the lease in an 
amount of at least $21,915.54. 
Then, in Plantiff s second set of Request for Admissions, the following three (3) questions 
were stated [R. 159-164 (Exhibit "7")]: 
1. Admit that Mi Ranchito d/b/a Guadalahara Grill is still an operating 
business. 
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2. Admit that the lease which is the subject of this action purports to have 
signature of Manuel T. Armenia, [emphasis added] 
3. Since it appears that your signature on your response to Plaintiff's 
Discovery Requests dated October 1, 1987 is the same persons signature that appears on 
the guarantee agreement which is the subject of this action, admit that you signed the 
guarantee, a copy of which is attached hereto, [emphasis added] 
It is obvious from the foregoing display of Plaintiff's questions that both sets of 
questions were asking the same admission to be made, namely, that Defendant signed the 
guarantee. Defendant had already denied that he signed same both in Defendant's Answer 
to the Complaint at the inception of this lawsuit, and then again in response to Plaintiff's 
first set of Request for Admissions. Yet, Plaintiff later obtained the judgment against 
Defendant based on the exact same question since Defendant never received such second 
set of Request for Admissions and thus never had actual notice and opportunity to re-state 
his denial thereof. In light of such facts, the demands of equity and fairness require that 
Defendant be granted the relief requested on this appeal. 
Also, this is not a case where a minimal judgment, such as $200.00, was entered 
against Defendant. Rather, the judgment amount entered against Defendant in this case 
was in the amount of $26,558.88! [R. 102-104] Where Defendant did not have actual 
notice of the judgment until August 28, 1998, and was therefore deprived of due process 
and a fair opportunity to move to vacate such judgment within the three (3) months' period 
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following entry of such judgment, and where the judgment itself is so huge in amount, 
Defendant should be permitted under principles of equity to have the opportunity to defend 
himself on the merits of this action. 
Plaintiff's counsel wishes to have the judgment in this case stand as entered, which 
in effect would permit Plaintiff's counsel to take advantage of serving Defendant at 
Defendant's Home Address with a Supplemental Proceedings Order to enable Plaintiff's 
counsel to pursue collection of the judgment against Defendant. However, on the other 
hand, Plaintiff's counsel wishes to deny Defendant the right to receive the same type of 
notice, i.e., service at Defendant's Home Address, of the judgment itself such that 
Defendant would have a fresh three (3) months' period in which to move the court to 
vacate the judgment entered. Substantial justice cannot be afforded to Defendant if such 
results are permitted because they favor Plaintiff's counsel over Defendant for no 
justifiable reason whatsoever. Thus, Defendant's appeal should be granted. 
V. THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CANNOT DEFEAT DEFENDANT'S 
ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF BASED ON LACK OF DUE PROCESS. 
Defendant contends that in the proper case as the case at bar, Defendant is entitled 
to relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where 
counsel's conduct was so extremely negligent as to deprive Defendant of the ability to 
properly defend himself. However, regardless of whether or not this Court agrees with 
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Defendant's position, Defendant is still entitled to relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) on the main 
grounds upon which this appeal is taken, namely, deprivation of due process. The 
deprivation of due process to Defendant is so obvious and so substantial that Defendant is 
entitled to have a fair opportunity to defend himself on the merits at a trial of this case. 
Therefore, this court should grant Defendant's appeal. 
Also, the trial court had discretion to grant Defendant's Motion to Vacate the 
judgment ". . .upon such terms as are just. . . . " Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The trial court could therefore have ordered Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff 
for some of its attorney's fees and costs as a precondition to granting Defendant's Motion 
to Vacate rather than cause Defendant's substantial rights to a trial on the merits be 
forfeited. The Utah courts have clearly stated that it abhors forfeiture of rights to a trial 
on the merits. As stated in Defendant's Appeal Brief, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
supported this proposition as follows: 
The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without serious 
injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward 
the setting aside of default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is made 
to set it aside. Consistent with the objective just stated, where there is doubt 
about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have an opportunity to 
present his side of the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance 
with law and justice, [emphasis added] Interstate Excavating, supra at 371. 
Based thereon, Defendant's appeal should be granted forthwith. 
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CONCLUSION 
The dictates of due process and equity favor granting relief to Defendant in light of 
the facts and circumstances of this case. The forfeiture of Defendant's rights to a trial on 
the merits cannot be permitted in light of strong public policy and the evidence presented. 
As such, this Court should grant all relief requested herein by Defendant. 
Dated: July 23, 1999 LAW OFFICES OF MONTIVEL A. BURKE, II 
ontivel A. Burke, lT~^ 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Manuel T. Armenta 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - BY MAIL 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document described as BRIEF BY APPELLANT by mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following, on the date of July 23 _, 1999. 
Bryan W . Cannon, Esq. 
Aspen Plaza 
871 E. 9400 S. 
Sandy, U T 84094 
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GARDINER AND GARDINER BUILDERS 
Cite as, Utah, 656 P.2d 429 
principal. The problem here lies with the lation of order 
verdict returned by the jury. They found 
liability on the part of Tenhoeve, but 
assessed damages at only $4,000. The 
assessed damages against Interwest is in 
the amount of $40,000, If in fact, Ten-
hoeve was a principal he would have the 
same liability as Interwest. The verdict, 
therefore, is inconsistent with finding 
Tenhoeve as a principal. Therefore, the 
motion to dismiss as to Tenhoeve will be 
granted. 
The confusion in this case appears to have 
resulted from plaintiffs' casting of Ten-
hoeve in the doubtful dual role of tortfeasor 
and defaulting obligor in the complaint. 
This matter was not presented to the jury 
for determination. 
We are of the opinion that the trial court 
did not err in his order dismissing the com-
plaint against Tenhoeve, which had the 
same effect as vacating the jury's verdict. 
Nor do we consider that the court's apprais-
al of the rules of procedure as applied to the 
history of this case, was inaccurate or inap-
propriate. 
Affirmed. 
v. SWAPP Utah 429 
to compel discovery, the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G. 
Hal Taylor, J., ordered all of defendant's 
pleadings stricken(^and entered default 
judgment against such defendant, (anil de-
nied motion to set aside judgment, and such 
defendant appealed The Supreme Court, 
held that, trial court did not err in treating 
motion as one concerning excusable neglect 
rather than one concerningj^any other rea-
son justifying relief" pursuant to governing 
Rule of Civil Procedure. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error o=>957(l) 
Judgment <§=*139 
Trial court has considerable discretion 
ruling on motion to set aside default 
judgment and Supreme Court will reverse 
trial court only where clear abuse of discre-
tion is shown. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). 
in 
STEWART and HOWE, JJ.f dissent. 
GARDINER AND GARDINER 
BUILDERS, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Reid SWAPP aka Reid Swapp Construc-
tion Company, Defendants, Cross-
Claimants and Appellants, 
and 
Tanglewood SLC Associates, Defendant, 
Cross-Claimant and Respondent. 
No. 18079. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 2, 1982. 
As sanction for repeatedly failing to 
respond to discovery procedures and forvio-
2. Judgment <s=>139 
Where record showed that attorney's 
failure to communicate with client may_npt 
have been_eniirjgly_j)£gligence of attorney, 
client failed to contact attorney_for one and 
agnail years after he filecTanswer and coun-
terclaim and client, by his own admission, 
learned of default judgment entered 
against him within three-month periodjpl-
lowing judgment, trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in testing client's motion to 
set aside judgment as one involving excusa-
ble neglect rather than as involving "any 
other reason justifying relief" within pur-
view of governing Rule of Civil Procedure. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(l, 7). 
Frederick A. Jackman, Paul James Tosca-
no, Orem, for defendants, cross-claimants 
and appellants. 
John A. Snow, Patricia 
Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
M. Leith, Salt 
cross-claimant 
PER CURIAM: 
As a sanction for repeatedly failing to 
respond to discovery procedures, and for 
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violation of the court's Order to Compel 
Discovery, the district court ordered all of 
the pleadings of defendant Reid Swapp aka 
Reid Swapp Construction Company strick-
en, and entered default judgment against 
that defendant and in favor of defendant 
Tangle wood SLC Associates on its cross-
claim. 
The default judgment was entered July 1, 
1981. On September 3, 1981, an Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings was served at 
the residence of Reid Swapp. Swapp failed 
to appear at the hearing on that order, and 
an Order to Show Cause was issued, which 
was personally served on Swapp on Septem-
ber 22, 1981. On that same day, Tangle-
wood's Execution was personally served on 
Swapp. 
On October 13, 1981, new counsel em-
ployed by Swapp filed a motion to set aside 
the judgment, and a motion to quash the 
execution. These motions were heard on 
October 19, 1981, and denied on that date. 
The court held that Swapp's motion to set 
aside the judgment was based on negli-
gence, and was not filed within the three-
month time limit of Rule 60(bXl), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Swapp now appeals, arguing that the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion to 
set aside the judgment under 60(b)(1). For 
the purposes of his motion to set aside the 
judgment, Swapp filed his affidavit in 
which he stated that his attorney had never 
communicated with him concerning the dis-
covery process, nor had he informed Swapp 
that he had received interrogatories, re-
quests for production of documents or a 
notice that Reid Swapp's deposition was to 
be taken. Swapp contends that he did not 
know of his attorney's stipulation to extend 
the time to answer these discovery proce-
dures, and was not informed that the order 
compelling him to answer discovery was 
issued. He further states that he did not 
learn of the default judgment until he re-
ceived the execution on September 22,1981. 
Swapp contends that the district court 
erred in testing his motion to set aside the 
judgment under the provisions of Rule 
60(bXl)t excusable neglect. He characteriz-
es the above facts asjibandonment by his 
attorney, and~arpues that such abandon-
ment constitutes "any other reason justify-
ing"relief . . . "~under* Rule 60(b)(7). ~He 
further argues that the negligence of his 
attorney may not be imputed to him under 
these circumstances. We do not agree. 
[1] The trial court has considerable dis-
cretion in ruling on a motion to set aside a 
default judgment under Rule 60(b) and this 
Court will reverse the trial court only 
where a clear abuse of discretion is shown. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 14 
Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Central 
Finance Company v. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 
284, 452 P.2d 316 (1969); Airkem Inter-
mountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429 (1973). We find no such abuse of 
discretion here. 
[2] While Swapp states in his affidavit 
that his attornqy never communicated with 
him concerning the discovery requests re-
ceived, the record shows that the failure to 
communicate may not have been entirely 
the negligence of the attorney. Further, 
even if the facts stated in the affidavit ara 
true, Swapp failed to con tart hip attornpv\ 
for one and a half years after he filed his/ 
answer and counterclaim. In Airkem, su-v 
pra, we found negligence on the part of the \ 
party, for such failure to communicate. In \ 
addition, Swapp should have learned of the I 
judgment taken against him by early Sep- J 
tember, when he was served with papers i n / 
supplemental proceedings. By his own ad- . # 
mission, Swapp did learn of the judgment " ^ / r ^ f t ^ , 
on September 22, 1981, still within the J rUffC€ or 
three-month period in which a motion undei^ )b\gu\utf 
Tkule 60(bKl) may be granted, v f Ifclk ^ 
We have previously held that the provi- W«f
 v i 
sions of Rule 60(b)(7) may not be used to f*fi**' 
circumvent the time limitation of Rule 
60(b)(1). Pitts v. McLachlan, Utah, 567 
P.2d 171 (1977). Swapp's contention that 
his motion was brought on grounds other 
than negligence is without merit. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
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LINCOLN BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; and Allstate Life Insurance 
Company, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
D.T. SOUTHERN PROPERTIES; James 
E. Hogle, Jr.; and Cornelius J. Versteeg, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 910366-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 23, 1992. 
Partner moved to set aside default 
judgment entered against him which relat-
ed to nonpayment on promissory note given 
to insurance company. The Seventh Dis-
trict Court, San Juan County, Boyd Bun-
nell, J., denied motion. Partnership and 
partner appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Garff, J., held that: (1) three-month statute 
of limitation for filing set aside motion 
applied to claims of excusable neglect and 
of reliance on former attorney, and (2) fail-
ure of insurance company to mail copy of 
default judgment to partner did not invali-
date default judgment. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error «=»842U) 
Trial court's determination that motion 
to set aside default judgment constitutes 
claim of excusable neglect rather than con-
stituting claim falling into set aside rule's 
residuary category is matter of law, re-
viewable for correctness with no particular 
deference. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(l, 
7). 
2. Judgment *=>343, 386(1) 
Residuary subdivision of rule allowing 
motions to set aside judgment embodies 
three requirements for relief: that reason 
be one other than those listed in other 
subdivisions; that reason justify relief; 
and that motion be made within reasonable 
time. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(7). 
3. Judgment e»343 
Residuary subdivision of rule allowing 
motions to set aside judgment may not be 
employed for relief when grounds of mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect are asserted are encompassed with-
in first subsection; otherwise, three-month 
time limitation for filing motions pursuant 
to first subsection would be circumvented. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(bX7). 
4. Judgment <S=368 
Reasons asserted for setting aside de-
fault judgment which were that attorney 
neglected to file answer and movant had 
mistakenly relied on attorney fell within 
first subsection of rule allowing for such 
relief when judgment has been entered be-
cause of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, and not within rule's 
residuary subsection; therefore, three-
month time limitation for filing such mo-
tion was applicable. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
60(b)(l, 7). 
5. Judgment «=>131 
Failure of plaintiffs to mail copy of 
default judgment to defendant did not in-
validate the default judgment. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rules 5(a), 58A(d); Judicial Adminis-
tration Rule 4-504(4). 
6. Judgment <s=>131 
Defendant was provided notice of and 
adequate opportunity for timely motion to 
set aside default judgment when he was 
personally served with court's order in sup-
plemental proceedings seven weeks after 
entry of default, even though plaintiff had 
failed to mail notice of default judgment to 
defendant. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 5(a), 
58A(d); Judicial Administration Rule 4-
504(4). 
Robert Felton and Harold R. Stephens, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lants. 
Clark W. Sessions and Michael T. Rob-
erts, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and ap-
pellees. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and GARFF, 
JJ. 
LINCOLN BEN. LIFE v. D.T. SOUTHERN PROP. 
Cite M US PJd 672 (Utah App. 1992) 




Defendants D.T. Southern Properties 
(DTSP) and James E. Hogle, Jr., appeal the 
trial court's refusal to set aside a default 
judgment entered against them in favor of 
plaintiffs, Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance 
Company (Lincoln) and Allstate Life Insur-
ance Company (Allstate). Pursuant to 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
we granted permission to appeal the 
court's interlocutory order denying the mo-
tion to set aside the default judgment. For 
the reasons stated below, we affirm. 
The facts, which are undisputed, are 
drawn from the record. On September 30, 
1986, DTSP, a Utah general partnership, 
executed and delivered a promissory note 
for $450,000.00 to Surety Life Insurance 
Company, the predecessor in interest to 
Lincoln and Allstate. The general partners 
who personally executed the note included 
Hogle, Cornelius J. Versteeg, Dennis W. 
Gay, and Antonius Versteeg. As part of 
the transaction, DTSP, through the same 
general partners, executed a deed of trust 
as security for payment of the note. In 
addition, Hogle and Cornelius J. Versteeg 
executed a guaranty agreement in which 
they guaranteed payment of the note. 
The partnership failed to make payments 
on the note, and a notice of default and 
election to sell the trust property was filed. 
The trustee subsequently gave notice of 
sale of the trust property, but the sale was 
cancelled after DTSP filed for protection 
under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code. In June 1989, the bank-
ruptcy court dismissed DTSP's Chapter 11 
case for failure to pay certain fees, failure 
to file a plan of reorganization and a disclo-
sure statement, and failure to file financial 
reports. 
The trustee again gave notice of sale of 
the property, and at the trustee's sale on 
October 16, 1989, Allstate, the highest bid-
der, purchased the property for $500,-
000.00. Apparently, that same day, DTSP 
sued to enjoin the sale and obtained a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) to stop the 
•«te. However, DTSP failed to serve the 
TRO prior to the sale. Thereafter, DTSP 
Utah 673 
injunc-
On January 22, 1990, Lincoln and All-
state sued DTSP, Hogle, and Cornelius J. 
Versteeg, by amended complaint, seeking 
to recover a deficiency judgment pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1990), and 
seeking to recover from Hogle and Ver-
steeg based on the guaranty agreement. 
On January 23, 1990, Hogle and Gay, the 
registered agent of DTSP, were personally 
served with a copy of the amended com-
plaint 
Versteeg filed an answer to the amended 
complaint on February 8, 1990. Neither 
DTSP nor Hogle, however, filed an answer 
to the amended complaint. On Ffthruajai. 
23, 1990, the clerk of the court entered 
default againstJQISE^nd Hogle, and the 
court entered^jug^ientj>y default against
 r 
them on May <SF7"T995T 
On July 16, 1990, the court signed an 
order in supplemental proceedings requir-
ing Hogle to appear on July 20, 1990, both 
individually and on behalf of DTSP, to an 
swer concerning his property and the prop-' 
erty of DTSP. Hogle was perso_najly 
served with a copy of the order onffulyT8, 
J990,. At the request oi Harold SfepheiSf 
attorney for DTSP and Hogle, the supple-
mental proceedings were continued to Au-
gust 3, 1990. Neither Hogle nor his attor-
ney appeared on August 3, 1990. The sup-
plemental proceedings were continued to 
August 20, 1990. Again, neither Hogle nor 
his attorney appeared. 
On August 21, 1990, the court signed a 
second order in supplemental proceedings 
requiring Hogle to appear before the court 
on September U, 1990, both individually 
and on behalf of DTSP, to answer concern-
ing his property and the property of DTSP. 
Hogle was personally served with a copy of 
the order on August 27, 1990. Because 
Hogle failed to comply with the order, the 
court, on September 11, 1990, directed the 
clerk of the court to issue a bench warrant 
for Hogle, with which he was personally 
served. Hogle again did not appear. On 
October 29, 1990, the court issued a bench 
warrant for Hogle to appear before the 
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court on November 14, 1990. The bench 
warrant, however, was recalled because it 
was not timely served. 
On November 30, 1990, Hogle, through 
his attorney, Mr. Stephens, filed a motion 
to set aside the default judgment. Hogle 
subsequently discharged Mr. Stephens as 
his attorney and retained Robert Felton as 
his new attorney of record. Mr. Felton 
filed a notice of appearance of counsel on 
December 4, 1990. On December 6, 1990, 
Hogle, through his new attorney, filed an 
amended motion to set aside the default 
judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(7). 
By affidavit attached to the amended mo-
tion, Hogle claimed he delivered the amend-
ed complaint to his former attorney, Mr. 
Stephens, who informed him that he would 
handle the matter. According to Hogle, 
Mr. Stephens told him in April 1990, that 
an answer to the amended complaint had 
been filed. Hogle further claimed, by way 
of his affidavit, that upon receiving the 
court's orders in supplemental proceedings, 
he immediately contacted Mr. Stephens, 
who assured him that he would take care 
of the matter. Finally, Hogle claimed in 
the affidavit that he relied on the profes-
sional skills of Mr. Stephens throughout 
this case. 
The court, on February 19, 1991, heard 
oral argument on the motion to set aside 
the default judgment, after which it took 
the matter under advisement. On March 1, 
1991, the court issued a memorandum deci-
sion denying the motion. In its ruling, the 
court concluded that the grounds asserted 
for setting aside the default judgment "fall 
within Rule 60(b)(1), and the Motion was 
not made within the time required by that 
Rule." The court also determined, in view 
of the surrounding circumstances, that Ho-
gle was negligent in continuing to rely on 
his attorney throughout the case. On 
March 28, 1991, the court entered an order 
denying the motion to set aside the default 
judgment. DTSP and Hogle filed a notice 
of appeal on April 18, 1991. 
DTSP and Hogle claim that their failure 
to file an answer or responsive pleading to 
the amended complaint was due solely to 
the negligence of their attorney, and that 
their attorney misrepresented to them that 
an answer had been filed. These circum-
stances, they contend, provide grounds for 
relief from the default judgment under 
subsection (7), rather than subsection (1) of 
Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, provides in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party . . . from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ... 
or (7) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasonf ] (1) . . . not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, 
or proceeding was entered or taken. 
[1] The trial court's determination that 
the motion to set aside the default judg-
ment constituted a Rule 60(b)(1) motion 
rather than a Rule 60(b)(7) motion is a 
conclusion of law. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 
(Utah App.1991). Consequently, we accord 
it no particular deference and review it for 
correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. Part-
nership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.t 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
[2,3] As the residuary clause of Rule 
60(b), subsection (7) embodies three re-
quirements for relief: "First, that the rea-
son be one other than those listed in subdi-
visions (1) through (6); second, that the 
reason justify relief; and third, that the 
motion be made within a reasonable time." 
Laub v. South Cent Utah Tel Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304, 130&-07 (Utah 1982). Subsec-
tion (7) "'should be very cautiously and 
sparingly invoked by the Court only in un-
usual and exceptional instances."' Id. at 
1307-08 (quoting Hughes v. Sanders, 287 
F.Supp. 332, 334 (E.D.Okla.1968)). Fur-
thermore, subsection (7) may not be em-
ployed for relief when the grounds assert-
ed are encompassed within subsection (1). 
Larsen r. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 
1984); Russell v. MartelU 681 P.2d 1193, 
FOWLER T. SEITER 
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1195 (Utah 1984). Otherwise, the three-
month time limitation for filing motions 
pursuant to subsection (1) would be circum-
vented. Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195; Laub, 
657 P.2d at 1308. 
[4] The reasons asserted by DTSP and 
Hogle for setting aside the default judg-
ment, namely, that their attorney neglected 
to file an answer and that Hogle mistaken-
Tvreliedjn^his attorney's assurances that 
an answer had been filed, fall wj^ hin Rulp 
60(b)U), which allows for relief when the 
judgment has been entered because of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusa-
ble neglect." Cf. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1308 
("This failure to act seasonably [through 
defendant's own mistake or neglect] falls 
more accurately under subdivision (1) of 
rule 60(b)."); Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 
171, 173-74 (Utah 1977) (Rule 60(b)(1) held 
to be dispositive when the issue is whether 
due diligence was exercised in presenting 
one's rights). Therefore, the trial court 
correctly concluded that the grounds as-
serted for relief fall within subsection (1). 
Because the grounds asserted for setting 
aside the default judgment fall within sub-
section (1) of Rule 60(b), the three-month 
time limitation for filing a motion is appli-
cable. In the instant case, Hogle filed the 
motion to set aside the default judgment on 
November 30, 1990, six months after the 
default judgment hadbeen entered. Ttius, 
the motion was untimely. We therefore 
affirm the trial court's refusal to set aside 
the default judgment 
[5,6] DTSP and Hogle argue that the 
failure of Lincoln and Allstate to mail a 
copy of the default judgment, as required 
by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 58A(d) 
and 5(a) as well as Rule 4-504(4), Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, impaired 
their ability to timely challenge the default 
judgment Although Lincoln and Allstate 
apparently concede the failure to give no-
tice, such a failure does not invalidate the 
default judgment1 Workman v. Nagle 
Constr.,Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah App. 
1990) (citing Mountain States Tel & Tel 
I. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(c) states that 
la ] judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a 
v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1988)). 
Moreover, "the failure to give the required 
notice is an important factor in determining 
the timeliness of post-judgment proceed-
ings, where an exact time limit is not pre-_ 
scribed." Workman, 802 P.2d at 751 (em-
phasis added). Notwithstanding the argu-
ment that LincofiTand Allstate failed to 
give notice, Hogle received notice of the 
default judgment on July 18, 1990, whfijpJut 
was personally served with the court's or-
der in supplemental proceedings. TTiisno-
tice, which Hogle received approximately 
seven weeks after the court entered de-
fault judgment, provided him adequate op-
portunity to timely move to set asideThe 
default judgment 
In sum, the trial court correctly conclud-
ed that the grounds of DTSP's and Hogle's 
motion to set aside the default judgment 
constituted a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, and the 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
such motion. Accordingly, we affirm. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
(o | MY HUHICI SYSTCM> 
James N. FOWLER and Sherril Fowler, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Terry R. SEITER, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 910698-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept 23, 1992. 
Lessees brought forcible entry and 
other claims against lessors of storage 
unit The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
City, John A. Rokich, J., entered judgment 
lien on real property, when the same is signed 
and filed as herein above provided." 
